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Abstract
When stimuli are consistently paired with reward, attention toward these stimuli becomes biased (e.g., Abrahamse, Braem, 
Notebaert & Verguts, et al., Psychological Bulletin 142:693–728, 2016, https ://doi.org/10.1037/bul00 00047 ). An impor-
tant premise is that participants need to repeatedly experience stimulus–reward pairings to obtain these effects (e.g., Awh, 
Belopolsky & Theeuwes, Trends in Cognitive Sciences 16:437–443, 2012, https ://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2012.06.010). This 
idea is based on associative learning theories (e.g., Pearce & Bouton, Annual Review of Psychology 52:111–139, 2001) that 
suggest that exposure to stimulus–reward pairings leads to the formation of stimulus–reward associations, and a transfer of 
salience of the reward to the neutral stimulus. However, novel learning theories (e.g., De Houwer, Learning and Motivation 
53:7–23, 2009, https ://doi.org/10.1016/j.lmot.2015.11.001) suggest such effects are not necessarily the result of associative 
learning, but can be caused by complex knowledge and expectancies as well. In the current experiment, we first instructed 
participants that a correct response to one centrally presented stimulus would be followed by a high reward, whereas a cor-
rect response to another centrally presented stimulus would be paired with a low reward. Before participants executed this 
task, they performed a visual probe task in which these stimuli were presented as distractors. We found that attention was 
drawn automatically toward high-reward stimuli relative to low-reward stimuli. This implies that complex inferences and 
expectancies can cause automatic attentional bias, challenging associative learning models of attentional control (Abrahamse 
et al., 2016; Awh et al., 2012).
Introduction
The last decade has seen a surge in studies on the effects of 
reward on attentional control (for reviews, see Abrahamse, 
Braem, Notebaert, & Verguts, 2016; Anderson, 2016; 
Chelazzi, Perlato, Santandrea, & Della Libera, 2013; Pes-
soa, 2014). For instance, visual search is more efficient when 
a reward-related stimulus functions as a target (e.g., Krist-
jansson et al., 2010) and less efficient when this stimulus 
functions as a distractor (e.g., Anderson, Laurent & Yantis, 
2011; Anderson & Yantis, 2012). Recent reviews distin-
guish different types of reward effects. There are short-term 
reward priming effects, in which a stimulus that is associ-
ated with reward on trial N-1 grabs attention on trial N, and 
longer-lasting reward biases that are the result of consistently 
presenting participants with stimulus–reward pairings in an 
extensive training phase (Pessoa, 2014). The latter effects 
last over large numbers of trials and have even been reported 
up to 6 months after training (Anderson & Yantis, 2013; also 
see Anderson et al., 2011; Della Libera & Chelazzi, 2009). 
Furthermore, they occur even when rewards are no longer 
given (e.g., Anderson et al., 2011; Lee & Shomstein, 2014) 
and when attending to reward-related stimuli is detrimental 
for the task at hand (e.g., Le Pelley, Pearson, Griffiths, & 
Beesley, 2015; Pearson, Donkin, Tran, Most, & Le Pelley, 
2015).
Until now, the general assumption regarding reactive 
effects of reward on attention is that they can be achieved 
only through associative learning (e.g., Abrahamse et al., 
2016) and require a learning history of at least hundreds of 
trials (e.g., Pessoa, 2014). It is proposed that the repeated 
paring of a stimulus and a reward leads to the formation 
of associations between the representation of the stimulus 
(commonly referred to as the conditioned stimulus or CS) 
and the representation of the reward (commonly referred 
to as the unconditioned stimulus or US; e.g., Anderson, 
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2016). Once this association has been formed, the salience 
and automatic “attention-grabbing” properties of the reward 
are assumed to transfer to the neutral stimulus, resulting in 
an attentional bias toward the CS (for a review on associative 
learning, see Pearce & Bouton, 2001).
On the basis of this idea, a new model of attentional pro-
cessing has been proposed by Awh et al. (2012; see also 
Failing & Theeuwes, 2018; Theeuwes, 2018), who suggest 
that the classical dichotomy of top-down and bottom-up 
attentional selection does not hold. Instead, they introduced 
two novel modes of attentional control: selection and reward 
history. When participants have a history of attending toward 
specific stimuli (e.g., because doing so results in receiving 
a high reward), they develop an attentional bias toward 
these stimuli. These effects are automatic in the sense that 
they are not strategic or top-down, because they still occur 
when rewards are no longer presented, or when attending 
to reward-related stimuli is detrimental for performance 
(e.g., Anderson et al., 2011); neither are they bottom-up: 
the stimuli do not have visual features that make them “pop-
out” (e.g., Theeuwes, 1991). Instead, they suggest that the 
attentional bias toward reward cues can be explained only by 
participants’ experience with the stimulus–reward pairings 
(i.e., reward history).
The perseverance of the idea that automatic attentional 
bias toward rewarding stimuli is due to a learning history 
is surprising, as developments within learning psychology 
have led to novel theories that suggest that it is not necessary 
to train the stimulus–reward pairings for hundreds of trials 
to obtain automatic effects. Instead, instructions regarding 
future (e.g., not experienced) events can also lead to the for-
mation of automatic associations in memory (e.g., Gawron-
ski & Bodenhausen, 2011; Ramamoorthy & Verguts, 2012). 
Other, propositional, learning theories go one step further 
and propose that the formation of associations is unneces-
sary to obtain automatic effects. Instead, automatic effects 
can be due to complex knowledge (De Houwer, 2009; 2015; 
Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009). On the basis of 
these theories, it is expected that instructions regarding stim-
ulus–reward pairings should also affect automatic attention.
Research has indeed shown that mere instructions have 
powerful effects on automatic behavior. For instance, instruc-
tions regarding the future pairing between a CS and an eval-
uative US affects the automatic evaluation of the CS, even 
though these pairings were not experienced (e.g., Mertens, 
Raes, & De Houwer, 2016). Similarly, Van Dessel, De Hou-
wer, & Gast (2015) showed that instructing participants to 
approach or avoid a specific CS affected participants’ auto-
matic evaluation of this CS. Instructions also have automatic 
effects in non-affective domains. For instance, Liefooghe, 
Wenke, and De Houwer (2012) showed that instructed stim-
ulus–response (S-R) mappings can result in the automatic 
activation of responses and influence behavior on other tasks 
(see also Everaert, Theeuwes, Liefooghe, & De Houwer, 
2014; Wenke, De Houwer, De Winne, & Liefooghe, 2015; 
see Brass, Liefooghe, Braem, & De Houwer, 2017; Meiran, 
Liefooghe, & De Houwer, 2015 for reviews). Furthermore, 
previous research has shown that merely holding items in 
working memory can bias attention toward these items (for a 
review, see Olivers, Peters, Houtkamp, & Roelfsema, 2011). 
Reactions are faster when targets are presented at the same 
location as a to-be-remembered stimulus (e.g., Dowd & 
Mitroff, 2013; Downing, 2000; Schwark, Dolgov, Sandry, 
& Volkman, 2013; Soto, Humphreys, & Heinke, 2008) and 
slower when it is presented at another location from a to-
be-remembered stimulus (e.g., Soto & Humphreys, 2007, 
2008). Finally, Tibboel, Liefooghe, and De Houwer (2016) 
gave participants instructions regarding future S–R map-
pings and examined attentional bias toward these stimuli. 
They reported an attentional bias toward stimuli that were 
linked to a future response compared to control stimuli. 
Interestingly, Tibboel et al. failed to find similar effects on 
the basis of instructed S–S mappings. This suggests that, 
whereas working memory alone can bias attention, it does 
not do so unconditionally.
The aim of the current paper is to examine the effects of 
instructed reward on attention. To examine this question, we 
adapted the procedure of Tibboel et al. (2016). Our experi-
ment consisted of two tasks, an inducer task and a diagnostic 
task. First, participants received instructions for the inducer 
task: there were two object names that were associated with 
either a high (10 points) or low (1 point) reward (see Fig. 1 
for an example). Participants were told that at an arbitrary 
moment, one of two following questions would appear in 
the center of the computer screen: “For which object do you 
earn 1 point?” or “For which object do you earn 10 points?” 
If participants answered this question correctly, they would 
earn the corresponding number of points. Participants who 
earned the most points were entered in a lottery for a gift 
certificate. Thus to win the gift certificate, participants were 
required to memorize both the high- and the low-reward 
stimulus.
After participants received the instructions for the 
inducer task, but before they were required to execute 
the task, they performed the diagnostic task. This was a 
visual probe task that required the identification of a probe 
(the letter E or F) and was designed to measure automatic 
attentional bias (e.g., Tibboel et al., 2016). Importantly, 
the visual probe was preceded by the presentation of pic-
tures of the two instructed objects from the inducer task. 
There were two types of trials: valid trials, in which the 
probe appeared in the location of the high-reward object, 
and invalid trials, in which it appeared in the location of 
the low-reward object. After 8 or 16 visual probe trials, 
one of the two inducer questions appeared, and when par-
ticipants answered the question correctly, they received the 
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corresponding number of points (i.e., 1 point for the ques-
tion “For which object do you earn 1 point?”; 10 points for 
the question “For which object do you earn 10 points?”). 
In each run, novel stimuli were used.
Thus, in the current study, we examine whether atten-
tion is automatically drawn to high (relative to low) reward 
stimuli under the following conditions: (1) participants have 
no previous experience with the stimuli, because the instruc-
tion screen always contained words referring to the objects 
and not the actual images that were used in the visual probe 
task. This rules out effects of selection history; (2) partici-
pants have no previous experience with the stimulus–reward 
contingencies, because they only receive the reward at the 
end of each run. This rules out effects of reward history; (3) 
the high- and low- reward stimuli are not visually salient, 
excluding effects of bottom-up processes; (4) both high- and 
low- reward stimuli are irrelevant to the attentional task, 
ruling out effects of top-down strategies to preferentially 
attend to the high-reward stimulus; (5) both the high- and 
low- reward contingencies need to be remembered to per-
form the inducer task, ruling out effects of strategies to 
preferentially rehearse the high-reward contingency. Hence, 
any difference in attention allocation can be due only to the 
instructed reward value of the stimuli.
Associative learning models predict that this manipula-
tion should not lead to differential allocation of automatic 
attention, because participants have no training with the 
stimulus–reward associations. In contrast, the novel learning 
theories discussed above predict an attentional bias toward 
high-reward stimuli relative to low-reward stimuli, on the 
basis of participants’ prior knowledge and expectancies.
Method
Participants
Participants were students of Erasmus University Rotterdam. 
We aimed for a sample of 50 participants, based on power 
analyses of the data of Experiment 1 of Tibboel et al. (2016), 
using G-power (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009). 
We tested 51 participants, who were rewarded course credit 
for their participation. Participants who received the most 
number of points were entered in a lottery to win one €25 
Fig. 1  Schematic example of a run in experiment 1
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gift certificate. There were two versions of the task: one 
in Dutch and one in English. Forty-one participants were 
foreign and performed the task in English. Ten participants 
were Dutch and performed the Dutch version of the task.1 
The study was conducted in accordance with the principles 
expressed in the Declaration of Helsinki.
Stimuli and materials
We selected 167 pictures of the Snodgrass and Vanderwart 
(1980) picture set to use as targets in the inducer task and as 
irrelevant cues in the visual probe task. In the instructions 
of the inducer task, we used the most often chosen object 
word to refer to the stimuli. All object words were presented 
in 24-point Courier New font. On visual probe trials, each 
object drawing was presented in black with a white back-
ground, inside a box that was 4.8 cm high and 6 cm wide 
(subtending 6.09 and 7.59 degrees of visual angle). These 
two boxes were presented 1.4 cm above and below fixation 
(subtending 1.78 degrees of visual angle). The fixation cross 
was presented in 16-point Courier New font. Targets in the 
visual probe task were the letter E and the letter F, presented 
in 18-point Courier New font. All stimuli, apart from the 
object drawings, were presented in white against a black 
background.
Procedure
Participants were seated in a testing room with two or four 
desks, separated by partitions. We used an HP desktop PC 
with a 19-inch color LCD monitor. One, two, three or four 
participants could be tested at the same time. After giv-
ing informed consent, they performed the experiment. For 
stimulus presentation and response registration, we used the 
E-Prime software package (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuc-
colotto, 2002a, 2002b). Responses were recorded with a 
standard QZERTY keyboard.
The experiment consisted of nine blocks of 4 runs (two in 
which the inducer task question referred to the high-reward 
association, and two in which the inducer task question 
referred to the low-reward association), resulting in 36 runs 
(see Fig. 1 for a schematic example of a run). A run started 
with the presentation of the instructions for the inducer task. 
First, a prompt appeared that read “press the space bar for 
instructions”. Second, a screen appeared in which an object 
name (e.g., “BALCONY”) was presented together with the 
amount of points that was associated with the object (“+1”). 
This information remained on the screen for 4000 ms. Sub-
sequently, a second instruction screen was presented with 
the second object name (e.g., “BOMB”), the other amount 
of points (“+10”). Thus, on each run, two objects were used, 
the first of which was related to low reward and the second 
was related to a high reward. Object names were picked 
randomly (without replacement) from the list of Snodgrass 
stimuli. After this, a screen appeared with the instruction to 
press the spacebar to begin.
This was followed by the presentation of the fixation cross 
for 1000 ms. Next, the two object pictures appeared each 
inside one of the boxes, for 500 ms. Then, the boxes were 
blank for 30 ms, after which the target (E or F) appeared 
either in the location of the high-reward stimulus (valid trial) 
or in the opposite location (invalid trial). Half of the tri-
als were valid, and the other half were invalid. The target 
remained on screen until a response was given. Participants 
were instructed to respond as quickly and accurately as pos-
sible. After an incorrect response, the word “WRONG” 
appeared on the screen for 500 ms. A trial was followed by 
an inter-trial interval that lasted between 250 and 500 ms. 
During this interval, the fixation cross and the blank boxes 
remained present on the screen.
In line with previous research on the automatic effects of 
instructions (e.g., Liefooghe et al., 2012), half of the runs 
consisted of 8 visual probe trials; the other half consisted of 
16 visual probe trials. This element of the procedure mini-
mizes the anticipation of the presentation of the inducer 
probe and thus encourages them to always be ready to exe-
cute the instructions.
After the last visual probe trial of the run, one of the 
two inducer task questions appeared (i.e., “For which object 
do you earn 1 point?”; “For which object do you earn 10 
points?”). After an incorrect response, the word “WRONG” 
was presented for 500 ms. If participants typed in a cor-
rect response, a screen appeared for 1000 ms with the feed-
back “CORRECT!” with below it the number of points they 
earned “+10” or “+1”, and below that “total points:” and 
the number of points they had earned so far. The run ended 
with a blank screen that was presented for a random dura-
tion lasting between 250 and 500 ms. Before the experiment, 
participants were told that participants who earned the most 
points would be eligible to enter a lottery for a €25 gift cer-
tificate. After completing the experiment, participants were 
thanked and asked to leave their email address if they wanted 
to be eligible for the lottery.
Analyses
We analyzed the percentage of correct responses on the 
inducer task and compared high- and low-reward runs using 
paired-samples t tests. For the visual probe task, we labeled 
trials as “valid” when the probe appeared at the location 
of the high-reward stimulus and “invalid” when the probe 
appeared at the location of the low-reward stimulus. We 
1 We analyzed the data with language as a between subject factor, 
this did not affect the data pattern.
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compared the means on reaction times and accuracy for 
valid and invalid trials using paired-samples t tests. Finally, 
we performed Bayesian analyses on the relevant t tests to 
compare the fit of the data under the null hypothesis to the 
fit under the alternative hypothesis. We used the more con-
servative JSZ Bayes factor (Jarosz & Wiley, 2014; Rouder, 
Speckman, Sun & Morey, 2009).
Results
We excluded data of 1 foreign participant who scored lower 
than 2.5 standard deviations below the mean accuracy on 
the inducer task and 2 participants (one Dutch, one foreign) 
whose reaction times were 2.5 standard deviations above the 
mean on the visual probe task, so the final sample consisted 
of 48 participants. We analyzed only the visual probe trials 
for runs on which the inducer task was performed correctly 
to be sure that participants had attended to and remembered 
the instructions of the inducer task.
Inducer task
Participants performed well on the inducer task, with a mean 
accuracy rate of M = .94, SD = .06. There was no effect of 
reward value of the inducer stimulus t < .24. Overall, par-
ticipants earned 187.08 points on average (SD = 12.87) out 
of a maximum of 198.
Visual probe task
Our t test on the accuracy data reveal no significant differ-
ences between valid, M = .97, SD = .02, and invalid trials, 
M = .97, SD = .02, t < .82. However, our reaction time analy-
ses show that the difference between trial types was highly 
significant, t(47) = 3.77, p < .001, d = .15. Participants were 
faster on valid, M = 639, SD = 75, 95% CI [628, 650], com-
pared to invalid trials, M = 651, SD = 80, 95% CI [640, 663]. 
The BF10 was 58.49, suggesting there is strong evidence 
that responses were faster for valid compared to invalid trials 
(Jefferies, 1961).
General discussion
Our study is the first to show that attention is biased toward 
stimuli that are paired with high relative to low reward on 
the basis of instructions. The fact that these effects had not 
yet been examined is likely due to the prominent assump-
tion, which suggests that automatic attentional bias for 
rewarding stimuli is the result of training (e.g., Pessoa, 
2014). This view suggests that the repeated presentation of 
a neutral CS with a rewarding US leads to the formation of 
CS–US associations in memory, which results in a transfer 
of the salience of the US to the CS (e.g., Anderson, 2016; 
Awh et al., 2012; Theeuwes, 2018). Our findings cannot 
be explained by these models: participants’ expectations 
regarding future stimulus–reward pairings are sufficient to 
bias their attention toward these stimuli even when they have 
no prior experience with the objects and no prior experience 
with the contingencies between the objects and the rewards 
at the beginning and during the each run. Importantly, the 
objects were not visually salient (i.e., there was no effect 
of bottom-up processes). Furthermore, it was not beneficial 
to attend to objects presented in the visual probe task (i.e., 
there was no effect of top-down processes2) for two reasons. 
First, the physical properties of the objects were not relevant 
(i.e., participants only needed to remember the associations 
between words and points, whereas the stimuli in the visual 
probe task were pictures). Second, participants could only 
be entered in the lottery for the gift certificate if they earned 
the most points. Thus, both high- and low-reward stimuli 
were equally important to be eligible for the lottery, and 
it was not beneficial to preferentially attend to or rehearse 
the high-reward stimuli relative to the low-reward stimuli. 
Instead, our data support novel learning theories that have 
so far been overlooked within the literature regarding reward 
effects on attention. These models propose that prior knowl-
edge, instructions, expectations, and deductive reasoning can 
result in similar effects as actual CS–US pairings (e.g., De 
Houwer, 2009; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2011; Rama-
moorthy & Verguts, 2012).
We believe that these theories open promising avenues for 
future research and generate novel questions regarding atten-
tional and other effects of rewards. For instance, it is crucial 
to examine mechanisms related to and possibly underlying 
the attentional bias toward instructed high-reward compared 
to instructed low-reward stimuli. Whereas experienced 
reward has widely been reported to affect visual attention 
(e.g., Anderson, 2016), it has also been reported to affect a 
range of other cognitive processes such as visual perception 
(e.g., Marx & Einhäuser, 2015; Wilbertz, Van Slooten, & 
Sterzer, 2014), visual working memory (e.g., Infanti, Hickey, 
& Turatto, 2015; Wallis, Stokes, Arnold, & Nobre, 2015), 
and conflict adaptation (Krebs, Boehler, & Woldorff, 2010). 
Furthermore, future studies need to examine the extent to 
2 It is important to note that there is still a debate about the definition 
of bottom-up and top-down processing. Whereas Theeuwes (2018) 
defines top-down attentional control as voluntary or goal-driven, oth-
ers consider any effects of context or expectations a form of top-down 
control (e.g., Gaspelin & Luck, 2018). Importantly, even with this 
broader definition, our study contributes to the reward literature by 
showing that expectations regarding stimulus–reward contingencies 
affect automatic attention in an unrelated task.
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which effects of instructed stimulus–reward pairings differ 
from the effects of trained stimulus–reward pairings.
Our study also allows us to shed light on dissociations 
between selection and reward. According to Awh et al. 
(2012) there is a distinction between attentional control 
on the basis of selection history and attentional control on 
the basis of reward history. However, in studies concerning 
effects of reward learning on attention, these two histories 
are confounded: in a typical experiment, participants learn 
to selectively attend to a reward-related stimulus during a 
training phase. In a subsequent test phase, their attention 
is biased toward this stimulus (e.g., Anderson et al., 2012). 
Note that this can be due both to their selection history (i.e., 
they are extensively trained to attend to this specific stimulus 
and to ignore other stimuli) as well as to their reward history 
(i.e., they received ample experience of the stimulus–reward 
pairing). Our study is not only the first to reveal the auto-
matic effects of reward when there are not stimulus–reward 
pairings, but it is also the first study to tease apart selection 
and reward effects.
As mentioned in our introduction, we previously found 
automatic effects of future action selection (i.e., instructed 
S-R mappings; Tibboel et  al., 2016). However, in the 
same study we also performed an experiment in which we 
examined the effects of instructed S–S mappings instead 
of instructed S–R mappings on attention. In this case, 
the instructions for the inducer task stated that a particu-
lar stimulus (e.g., a picture of a balcony) was paired with 
another stimulus (i.e., the color green) and that participants 
needed to remember this pairing. At the end of the run, a 
picture would appear in either the specified color (e.g., a 
green balcony) or another color (e.g., a blue balcony) and 
participants needed to indicate whether the pairing was in 
line with the instructions. In this experiment, stimuli were 
thus not associated with a particular response (i.e., there 
was no S–R mapping), but only with a particular stimulus 
(i.e., an S–S mapping). Results showed that these future S–S 
mappings failed to bias attention. In the current study, how-
ever, the attentional bias can be due only to the instructed 
stimulus–reward mapping (an S–S mapping) and not due to 
instructed S-R mappings, as both stimuli were associated 
with a response. In other words, our studies suggest that both 
future selection and future reward have separate effects on 
attentional processing.
Our findings do not only have important theoretical 
implications, but they are also relevant for contexts in 
which reward processing is maladaptive. Maladaptive rein-
forcement learning is assumed to play an important role in 
addiction and schizophrenia (e.g., Frank, 2008; Robinson & 
Berridge, 2003) and cognitive bias modification (CBM) pro-
cedures have been developed to change these biases on the 
basis of direct experience (e.g., Cox). However, questions 
have risen regarding the processes underlying CBM effects 
(e.g., Beard, 2011; Heeren et al., 2013; Van Bockstaele et al., 
2014). A better understanding of how automatic bias toward 
reward-related stimuli develop (e.g., through direct experi-
ence or through derivation) can eventually steer us toward 
better interventions to change these biases.
Finally, we must note that we find a relatively strong 
attentional bias toward high- relative to low-reward stimuli, 
and the question remains how this effect holds up to effects 
of experience. Automatic effects on the basis of instruc-
tions are often smaller than automatic effects on the basis 
of experience (e.g., Van Dessel et al., 2015; Wenke et al., 
2015). Even though we did not directly compare experienced 
and instructed stimulus–reward pairings, our effect sizes 
are smaller than those reported in reactive training studies 
(e.g., Anderson et al., 2011). Our data support accounts sug-
gesting that experience might not be crucial to obtain auto-
matic effects and experience does further consolidate the 
instructed contingencies (e.g., Wenke et al., 2015).
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